I recently signed up to be on the e-mail list for a group called Keshet (www.keshetonline.org), a Jewish GLBTQ group based in Boston. The group seems good, based on their e-newsletter: They are sponsoring various gay-straight alliances throughout the nation, a cabaret in Massachusetts, GLBTQ birthright (in co-operation with Nehirim), and, most excitingly in my mind: A writing contest! (http://keshetonline.org/news/index.php/2010/12/09/announcing-keshet%E2%80%99s-jewish-childrens-book-writing-contest/)
There is one part of the newsletter however, that gave me pause: Dvar Torahs that reclaim "a queer seat at the table". I fully believe in reclaiming religious texts - whether from a feminist, GLBTQ, or other framework.
I think however, it is important to recognize reclamations as reclamations. The way I see it, a major hashkafic difference between Orthodox and other streams of Judaism pends on textual interpretation and textual authority. This religious difference mirrors two streams of thought in critical text study: The first, which has fallen out of vogue, maintains that the author's intent "matters", while the second discounts authorial intent, and is all about what can be read into the text, or how the text can be deconstructed. Context may matter for deconstructing discourse, but that is its limit.
I would argue that more "liberal" streams of Judaism have a more postmodern approach: Each interpretation of the text is equally valid, regardless of authorial intent. My interpretation is as valid as Rashi's, because the meaning of the text changes - that is its beauty, and what makes Torah a tree of life. (Just as evolution is what makes the Constitution "a living document" -lihavdil.)
The other position is that, while my own interpretations may be nice, it is the rabbis of previous generations who have the authority to interpret text officially, and my interpretation has no value beyond the personal meaning I find in it. Furthermore, if it contradicts the authorized interpretation or authorial intent at all, it must be "wrong".
There is a third, more "middle of the road" (centrist as Obama's SOU?) path: Modern interpretations are valid. All can have personal truth for the person who creates them, and should be used to enrich the religious experiences of those who find them meaningful. They should be used however, to complement, but not replace, the authorized interpretation.
These interpretations become problematic only if they contradict the plain meaning of Torah verses. If they contradict mainstream rabbinic opinion however, then the contradiction must be acknowledged, and each opinion recognized as valid, but in different ways. The authority that stems from tradition must be stressed, and while one can acknowledge anti-halachik interpretations of a an issue, one must still advocate halachik practice, accepting the cognitive dissonance derived from such an approach - a dissonance inherent in the beauty and complexity of Modern Orthodoxy.
The above streams are referring to institutional and pedagogical approaches. On a personal level, an Orthodox Jew may indeed choose to reject an Orthodox approach to a certain issue - I don't think it makes them less Orthodox, if they accept the Orthodox approach in general, and are Orthodox in practice.* But I do think it makes an institution or educator less Orthodox to teach a modern view to the exclusion of ancient sources, or to teaches the content of ancient sources while discounting their validity in favor of a modern approach.
I do not expect Keshet to adhere to a Modern Orthodox viewpoint, but the inclusion of the Dvar Torahs reminded me of a general critique I have of certain groups within certain denominations of Judaism: The modern, liberal interpretation of the text is given primacy over the traditional sources. I believe each should be at least equally weighted, though on an individual level, each person may choose the one they find more meaningful, because, there is something to be said for the weight of tradition - not even religiously per se, but rather, historically and culturally.
Judaism is a religion that very much values tradition: On a certain level, halacha has authority because generations of Jews have imbued it with authority. While this may seem circular, it is important to acknowledge that part of halacha's power is connecting to a community of current and past generations who have followed halacha. I believe that the communal power of halacha is recognized in the Torah, where many laws are given "because you were slaves in Egypt" - ie, as a way of connecting to the enslavement experience of one's ancestors, and where the entire nation must be present at Har Sinay, where it is the community's acceptance of the Law that binds them to it.** It is precisely because Judaism is such a communal religion that stigmatizing GLBTQ people as a community can be so devastating to them religiously, and sever their connection to Judaism. (If you do not believe me, see the ex-Chassid in "Trembling Before God".)
I guess this is just an example of how gender/GLBTQ issues often are the loci at which major hashkafic issues manifest themselves: In this case, the issue is textual authority and interpretation, but it is also a bigger issue - Do we fit the Torah into our modern lifestyle, do we fit our modern outlook into the Torah, or do we try to juggle each realm separately, and never the twain shall meet?
* Of course, I object to the very concept of judging how "Orthodox" a person is, since it violates the Pirkey Avot maxim "Do not judge a person until you come to his place" - as does judging a person's religiosity.
** This is amplified in the story of the oven of achsenay, where Rabbi Eliezer has the right ruling according to the letter of the law - a voice comes down from heaven and says so, but the rabbinic majority overules Rabbi E anyway, saying "It is not in the heavens" ie, when God gave the Torah, He imbued the rabbis with the authority to interpret the Torah the way that they wished, and exegesis and halachik rulings were passed out of God's hands and into the hands of God. In the story, God's response is to laugh, saying "My children have won", after which God does not prevent the rabbinic quorum from overuling and excommunicating Rabbi E. Interestingly, this story is often used for an ultra-conservative interpretation: The authority of traditional rabbinic authority stems from God, and they must be followed no matter what, because even if they are "wrong", they are "right", in that they were given authority to be obeyed even if they are wrong or make mistakes. On the other hand, this story can be interpreted in a very liberal way: Torah interpretation is in the hands of people and even if it is "wrong" and goes against the traditional meaning of the text, that is ok, because God gave the Jews the permission/authority to form their own interpretations, and even if those interpretations go against God's opinion, they are still valid! Either way, it is very empowering to people - the question is, which people.
I think you've actually described *four* approaches:
ReplyDelete1) Authorial intent is what matters
2) My interpretation is valid, regardless of authorial intent
3) Chazal's interpretation is what matters, regardless of authorial intent
4) The middle of the road approach, i.e., Chazal's is what matters, but yours is nice too, so long as you don't do anything with it.
(And I think there may be a fifth way, which depends on what you mean by "intent.")
The key is that I think you merged (1) and (3), which are not the same (the nafka mina, of course, being - what do you if Chazal is wrong in some way, or to some extent?).
You know, Rav Bigman always used to say that "Eilu v'eilu" was the lifeblood of the yeshiva student and the bane of the posek. And I think he's right...but what it gets at is that for the middle-of-the-road option, it doesn't even have to be just a personal truth - it can have *absolute* truth and meaning. But multiple interpretations can have that, so l'maaseh, you end up having to choose one.